Introduction
Despite its successes, Quantum Mechanics still has unsolved conceptual problems regarding measurements and the collapse of the wavefunction, as described in section 2.1. Everett's relative state formulation [EI57] , also known as the Many Worlds Interpretation, attempted to rid the quantum formalism of its ambiguities by eliminating the Measurement Postulate, and assuming the remaining postulates could be applied even to macroscopic systems. In this formulation, detailed in section 2.2, after a measurement the quantum state of an observer is a superposition of several versions of himself, each correlated to one of the observed results. The quantum collapse is only apparent, due to the fact that each version of the observer is unaware of the others. This may seem too far-fetched, but it is a natural consequence of the formalism, and the Many Worlds Interpretation actually promises a much clearer picture of the measurement process than the one provided by the Copenhagen Interpretation.
Unfortunately, as Everett's formulation solves old problems it creates new ones. One is how to properly carve classical realities out of the quantum state of a macroscopic system, but it is believed that decoherence, which we discuss in section 2.3, might solve this. The worst problem is a possibility of total disagreement with experimental evidence. Quantum measurements give results that seem probabilistic, with chances given by the Born Rule. As this rule was thrown away with the Measurement Postulate, and the other quantum postulates are all deterministic, it is not clear how the observed probabilities could reappear in the Many Worlds Interpretation. Many attempts have been made to deal with this problem, which we discuss in section 2.4.
One approach, proposed by Deutsch [Deu99] , adapts Decision Theory to the Everettian setting. In his formulation, an agent, who believes in the Everettian formalism and has no illusions about a single probabilistic result, has to decide on bets involving quantum measurements. He attempts to show that quantum symmetries force rational decisions to be the same as if the agent thought the bets were probabilistic and followed the Born Rule.
This received many criticisms, as shown in section 2.5, which led to increasingly more refined arguments, culminating in Wallace's formal proof [Wal12] . Even if some critics remain unconvinced, and question some of his axioms or the meaning of his result, there has been, so far, no criticism of the proof itself. Even among those who agree with Wallace, and have proposed similar ideas, there does not seem to have been any attempts at improving and clarifying his proof. In this paper we fill these gaps, providing a detailed analysis of Wallace's arguments and proof.
Section 3 establishes some general principles that should guide any attempts to obtain the Born Rule in the Everettian formalism, and point out some troublesome particularities of this formalism that one should pay attention to. In section 4, we examine Wallace's concepts, axioms and proof in detail. To clarify it, we simplified and standardized the notation, added new axioms to formalize ideas that were implicit, rewrote parts of the proof, and filled in most details. In the process, we present problems we encountered, and, when possible, propose some ideas on how to fix them. In section 5 we compare Wallace's work with classical decision theory, to dismiss a common misunderstanding that it is an adaptation of Savage's theory of subjective probabilities. Appendix A presents Classical Decision Theory, for those unfamiliar with it, as it helps in following Wallace's ideas.
Preliminaries 2.1 The measurement problem
In the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (CQM), the Measurement Postulate states that, if a system in a state
with i | j = δij and |ci| 2 = 1, is measured with respect to the basis {|i }, the result will be one (and only one) of the i's, with the state collapsing to the corresponding |i . Also, results are probabilistic, following the Born Rule.
Born Rule. The probability of obtaining result i is given by pi = wi, where wi is the corresponding Born weight defined by wi = |ci| 2 .
This Postulate agrees with experimental data, but introduces many ambiguities into the theory. It sets measurements apart from other quantum processes, which follow the deterministic linear Schrödinger's equation, but it lacks a definition of which processes constitute measurements. What seems to distinguish these are interactions with a macroscopic system, but if its particles obey Schrödinger's equation, how can they collectively produce a nonlinear probabilistic process?
This relates to the problem of whether Quantum Mechanics remains valid as the number of particles increases, with Classical Mechanics gradually emerging from it. In the usual view, quantum superpositions should not happen at the macroscopic level, lest we observe Schrödinger cats.
But the quantum formalism does not seem to predict that superpositions should decrease with the number of particles, quite to the contrary. Hence many physicists consider Quantum Mechanics applicable only to microscopic systems, with a more general theory being needed to explain the quantum-classical transition.
In the last decades, a possible explanation for this transition has been found in the process of decoherence, which we present in section 2.3. However, it is questionable whether it really explains the disappearance of quantum superpositions, or merely predicts that the components of the superposition have low interference, surviving nonetheless.
For more on the measurement problem, see [WZ14, Aul00] , and references therein.
Everettian quantum mechanics
H. Everett III [EI57] proposed a solution to this problem, in what became known as the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, or simply Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM). In this formalism the Measurement Postulate is rejected, and all systems (even macroscopic ones) evolve at all times (including measurements) according to Schrödin-ger's equation. This leads to macroscopic superpositions, but also implies that observers do not perceive them. If not for some unsolved problems, it might explain both quantum and classical experiments, providing the missing link between them.
In EQM, a measuring device for the basis {|i } of a system is any apparatus whose interaction with the system is such that, if the system is in state |i , and |M is the quantum state of the device, the composite state evolves as 1 |i ⊗ |M −→ |i ⊗ |Mi , where |Mi is a new state of the device, registering i as the result. Linearity of Schrödinger's equation implies that, if the system started in state (1), the composite system would evolve as
This final state is to be accepted as an actual quantum superposition of macroscopic states, but it will not be perceived by an observer who looks at the device. Instead, by the same linearity argument, the state |O of the observer will also evolve into several different states, according to
where |Oi is a state in which the observer saw result i registered in the device. Linearity also implies that each component |i ⊗|Mi ⊗|Oi evolves almost independently, as if the others did not exist, as long as interference remains negligible. In section 2.3 we discuss why this may be a reasonable assumption.
Everett's interpretation of this final state is that the agent has split into several versions of himself, each observing a different result. Each version evolves as if the initial composite state had been |i ⊗ |M ⊗ |O , so he never feels the splitting, nor the existence of his other versions. Each component is called a world or a branch, and this evolution of one world into a superposition of several others is called a branching process. So in EQM all possible results of a measurement actually happen, although in different worlds. The observer in state |Oi thinks the system has collapsed into |i , but only because he can not see the whole picture, with all other results and versions of himself. Although "splitting of worlds" seems to imply the whole Universe is affected by each measurement, it is more appropriate to think of the branches as local macroscopic superpositions, which evolve independent from each other, and gradually propagate, causing new systems to split as they interact, thus preserving locality.
The problems that plague the Copenhagen Interpretation disappear in this formulation, but EQM has its own set of difficulties, like the Preferred Basis Problem and the Probability Problem. There is also the question of whether it is possible to test experimentally if our universe is Copenhagean or Everettian, but a solution to those two problems would give EQM a theoretical standing as good as the Copenhagen Interpretation, or actually better.
Decoherence
The Preferred Basis Problem arrises from the fact that a quantum state like (3) can be formally decomposed in different ways [Zur81] , so it is not clear which basis gives the correct description in terms of actual worlds. The mechanism of decoherence might provide a solution to this problem, and also explain why branches have negligible interference. We give a very crude description of it, and refer to [Sch07, JZK
+ 03] for more details. If a system is in a state ψ = ψ1 + ψ2, and its components evolve as ψ1 → ϕ + φ and ψ2 → ϕ − φ, linearity implies that in the evolution of ψ interference will eliminate the φ component. Suppose, however, that the system first interacts with the environment, seen as another system with many degrees of freedom, in a state Ω, and their interaction is such that the composite state evolves as
where Ω1 and Ω2 are orthogonal. If now the system evolves as before, the final state will be (ϕ + φ) ⊗ Ω1 + (ϕ − φ) ⊗ Ω2, with no interference as each φ component is correlated to a different state of the environment. If Ω1 and Ω2 are only almost orthogonal, some interference between ψ1 and ψ2 remains. But if the system has enough interaction with the environment, and ψ1 and ψ2 affect the many degrees of freedom of Ω in quite distinct ways, any non-orthogonal components of Ω1 and Ω2 will decay extremely fast. This should be the case if the system is is too big to be kept well isolated, and ψ1 and ψ2 represent macroscopically distinct states.
As in (3), the decomposition in (4) may not be unique. But interaction with the environment may allow only one (up to macroscopic similarity) such decomposition to be dynamically stable. The continuous scattering of atoms and light by the macroscopic system causes (4) to be reasonably stable only if each ψi has somewhat well defined values of position and momentum. In such case we say that the basis {ψ1, ψ2} has been selected by the environment.
The imprecision in this selection requires taking a coarse graining of macroscopically similar states. More precisely, macroscopic similarity can be defined in terms of the coarse graining required to achieve such uniqueness and stability, at least approximately.
Once the system is entangled, to describe its state, without having to specify that of the environment, one must use the formalism of reduced density matrices. These embed data about all that can be measured locally on the system, but miss all information about how it is entangled to the environment. An important difference of this formalism is that the evolution of a reduced density matrix does not have to be unitary, even if the system+environment evolves unitarily. The off-diagonal terms of these matrices are called coherences, and depend on Ω1|Ω2 . As these decay, the matrix approaches a diagonal one, corresponding to a classical probabilistic mixture. We say the system has decohered, i.e. lost its quantum coherence. This can also be seen in terms of information about the quantum phases of ψ1 and ψ2 being lost into the environment.
Although decoherence might explain how classical behavior can emerge from a quantum system, there is no consensus on the exact meaning of this. Some interpret measurements in terms of decoherence, with the measuring device playing the role of environment (while being "measured" itself by the larger environment). However, the probabilistic mixture appears in the mathematical formalism only by hiding the environment. The whole system+environment remains in a purely quantum state, with all its components, so this is not enough to explain the disappearance of those not corresponding to the observed result.
In the Many Worlds view [Wal10a] , all components remain, but entangled to (almost) orthogonal states of the environment. In this interpretation, the role of decoherence is just to (almost) select the decomposition basis, and to (almost) eliminate interference between the components.
The probability problem
In EQM the chance for a result to appear is either 0% (if ci = 0) or 100% (if ci = 0, even if not all versions of the observer see it). The Probability Problem is how to reconcile this with the experimental record, which seems to indicate that results are probabilistic and follow the Born Rule.
This involves a qualitative aspect, how probabilities emerge from a deterministic theory. Classical Mechanics is also deterministic, but processes can appear random due to our ignorance of their details. But in EQM one needs to explain randomness even when the quantum state and its evolution are known with precision. Some authors [Vai98, Sau10, SC14] argue that there is uncertainty in the time after the apparatus has measured the system, but before each version of the agent has seen the result, as during this period branching has already happened, but each version is still ignorant as to which branch he is in. However, this so called selflocating uncertainty assumes the agent splits even before he is aware of the results, which is a non-local (and arguably not valid) view of how branchings occur.
There is also the quantitative aspect of how to account for the probability values. Everett [EI57] proved that if a measure is to be attributed to each branch, in such a way that it is preserved by further branchings, it has to be given by the Born weights. Gleason's theorem [Gle57] also implies it, if the probability of a branch is to be independent of the choice of decomposition basis. But until we know how a natural probability can emerge in EQM, we can not be sure if it will have such properties. Of course, if it does not, this might mean that EQM is not a good physical theory (although, if the Preferred Basis Problem is solved, Gleason's hypothesis loses its appeal).
At first, the most natural probability for EQM seems to be a counting measure. The idea is that a measurement with n possible outcomes produces n branches. After many such measurements, any sequence of results will appear in some branch, but to most versions of the observer the frequency of each outcome would tend to 1/n. The amplitudes ci in (1) have no influence on these probabilities, in disagreement with Born's rule and quantum experiments. This measure violates both Gleason's and Everett's conditions, as the probability attributed to a branch will depend on how many other branches are there in the chosen decomposition basis, and it is not conserved if on each branch a different new measurement is performed.
Graham [Gra73] 2 tried to reconcile the counting measure with the Born Rule, showing that the total norm of branches with results deviating from the Born Rule tends to 0, when the number of measurements tends to infinity. As real experiments are always finite, this only means that the norm will be very small, which would only imply that such branches are negligible if the norm already had a probability interpretation, producing a circular argument.
Once EQM is combined with decoherence, counting branches becomes meaningless. Measurements are no different than any other process in EQM, so branchings can happen in all interactions, becoming a continuous and pervasive phenomena. The throw of a die produces not 6 but an incredibly large number of components, resulting from all interactions of the die with the air, table, etc. These components might not be equally distributed among the 6 results of the die, as the number of black dots on the upside face might affect the amount of branching due to interactions with the light. And the number of components corresponding to each result might be changing all the time, in ways that are impossible to predict.
On the other hand, as most interactions involve few particles, the resulting components are not different enough to have negligible interference between them. So we have to consider a coarse-graining of components, in which similar ones are grouped together and considered as a single branch. This reduces and stabilizes the number of branches, but at the cost of making it ill defined, as it depends on how coarsely one chooses to group the components. And the ratio of branches of different results might not be preserved when passing to a finer graining.
Other attempts have been made to solve the Probability Problem [AL88, Han03, Zur05, BHZ06], but we focus on Deutsch and Wallace's use of Decision Theory.
The decision theoretic approach
In [Deu99] Deutsch proposed an adaptation of Decision Theory (see Appendix A) to the Everettian setting. This theory aims to explain how rational decisions should be made in situations having probabilistic outcomes (decision under risk), and, when probabilities are unknown, it shows an agent's subjective probabilities can be inferred from his decisions (decision under uncertainty).
Deutsch's idea was to show that, in an Everettian Universe, it would be rational to make decisions, related to quantum experiments, as if the outcomes were probabilistic, with the Born weights (2) playing the role of probabilities. So a rational decision maker in such Universe would behave as if it were Copenhagean, using the following strategy:
Born Strategy. Decisions follow the Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility (PMEU), using the Born weights (2) to redefine expected utilities as
As in EQM the uniqueness of the result of a quantum measurement is only apparent, it might seem reasonable to describe the illusion of chance in terms of subjective probabilities. Wal12] , which stand as the strongest defense of the decision theoretic point of view. In this article we try to fill this gap.
3 How (not) to prove a Born-like rule
In EQM, it does not make sense to literally prove Born's Rule, so to show its compatibility with our experimental observations the best one can hope to obtain is a Born-Like Rule (BLR). Any result showing physicists in an Everettian Universe would perceive it as so experimentally similar to a Copenhagean Universe, that they might believe in CQM.
For such rule to serve its purpose, its proof must satisfy the following conditions. They may seem obvious, but much of the debate surrounding the use of decision theory to prove the Born Rule, both in favor and against, has frequently violated some of them.
C1. All results must be proven using the laws of EQM, compatible physical theories, and properly justified new axioms.
C2.
No possibility can be excluded unless it demonstrably contradicts EQM or new axioms.
C3. It can not rely on assumptions depending, even implicitly, on the validity of a BLR. In particular, it can not assume an Everettian Universe would be similar to ours.
C4. New axioms can not lead to consequences contradicting experimental observation.
In C1, by compatible we mean the usual physical theories, but taking special care with results, like the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which are poorly understood and might be related to the Measurement Problem. By C3, our acceptance of the Second Law does not mean it can be used with EQM. Similarly, we must check whether new axioms make sense in the Everettian setting, even if they seem natural in our Universe.
Note that C1 and C2 impose a very delicate balance. No possibility can be taken for granted unless it can be proven as a consequence of EQM, or has some other strong justification for it. But none can be ruled out, either, just because we see no justification for it in EQM. Our comprehension of EQM is still very limited, and the history of Quantum Mechanics is full of results no one thought possible.
The same is true of C3 and C4. We can not assume an Everettian Universe has characteristics similar to ours, except for those derived from the formalism. So, no possibility can be ruled out just because it contradicts our physical experience. At the same time, we can not assume or deduce observable characteristics not present in our Universe (up to our present experimental capabilities), as that would go against the idea of a BLR.
This may seem too stringent, and a bit unfair, as no one is required to prove compatibility of the Second Law with CQM before they are used together. The difference is that CQM, despite its theoretical flaws, is experimentally accurate, so it approximates our reality well enough to be combined with other results from our physical experience. As EQM is suspect of incompatibility with experimental results, the bar has to be set much higher, and mixing it with the rest of our physical knowledge requires special care. These conditions might make it impossibly difficult to prove a BLR, but we do not think they can be relaxed, unless, for example, the proof led to experimentally testable new results.
Estimating the amount of branches
As discussed in section 2.4, to our present knowledge there is no way to attribute a precise number to the amount of branches, as it depends on the decomposition basis, and varies wildly as branchings occur all the time. A coarse graining of macroscopically similar branches might give us a number, but it would be somewhat arbitrary as it depends on the fineness of grain.
However, by C2 we can not immediately exclude the possibility that there might be some natural way to count branches, or groups of branches, unknown to us, but perhaps even intuitive to an Everettian agent. We present some possibilities, just to show that there does not seem to be anything in EQM that strictly forbids any sort of branch counting:
• perhaps there is an optimal fineness of grain, coarse enough to stabilize the amount of branches, yet fine enough not to group together macroscopically dissimilar states;
• there might be a natural measure, giving higher weights to branches that are present even on very coarse grainings, and smaller weights to branches that only appear on finer grainings, in such a way that the resulting value remains relatively stable;
• it might be enough to get, instead of a precise number, some kind of average number of branches, perhaps with some variance;
• even if it is impossible to quantify the amount of branches, there might be a qualitative way to compare branching structures, in ways that might be relevant to an Everettian agent. There might be a well defined way to say when one branching structure is significantly richer than other, or that after a measurement it becomes more ramified.
Even if these examples turn out to be wrong, the point is we can not assume a meaningful concept of "amount of branches" is impossible just because we do not know yet how to define it. Until such impossibility is proven, there is no guarantee that EQM is free from the problems that such concept might entail for the conservation of probabilities.
Macrostate discontinuities
A consequence of the Born Rule is that components whose amplitudes are small enough can be neglected, and small perturbations of a state do not alter significantly its physical meaning. By C3, when proving a BLR one can not assume this to remain valid, nor can it be justified on the basis of our physical experience. So, if such negligibility is to be used, explicitly or not, it must first be proven to be a consequence of the axioms.
Let
, where the |0 and |1 are macroscopically distinct states and ǫ is small. Until a BLR is proven, the component |1
should not be considered negligible as long as ǫ = 0. So the physical content of |ψǫ is drastically altered when ǫ changes from 0 (only macrostate |0 ) to non-zero (two macrostates, both relevant). We call this kind of phenomena a Macrostate Discontinuity. It implies that arbitrarily small perturbations in any state can lead to the appearance of any number of totally different new macrostates, all relevant.
One can argue that no reasonable physical theory can have such discontinuities. But, by C2 and C3, such possibility can not be dismissed, as EQM might simply not be a good theory. So any assumptions of continuity in the proof of a BLR have to be carefully examined, at least until macrostate discontinuities can be proven incompatible with EQM.
No decoherence?
This also creates problems for decoherence, as almost orthogonality of Ω1 and Ω2 in (4) only implies negligible interference if small non-orthogonal components can be considered irrelevant.
Wallace's response [Wal12, p.253 ] to the accusation of circularity in the use of decoherence seems to be that the Hilbert space metric must serve as a measure of significance, even without a probabilistic interpretation. He argues that it is a natural measure of state perturbations, being preserved by the dynamics. Also, if the formalism of EQM includes a metric but we do not accept it as a measure of approximation, the same problem should apply to the spatial metric in classical physics, or any other metric used in science.
However, dynamical conservation might not be what makes a metric "natural", as classical dynamics preserves the phase space measure, not its metric. The reason we can say that very close points are almost indistinguishable is experimental. In classical mechanics we know what a point in phase space represents observationally, how to measure it, and that the imprecision in this measurement can be described in terms of that metric.
Such argument does not apply to EQM, as the removal of the Measurement Postulate has severed the usual link between quantum formalism and experimental observation. We are trying to rebuild this link, but until one succeeds in understanding the experimental meaning of a state |ψ in EQM, there is no guarantee that states that are close in the Hilbert metric will generate similar observations. Note also that no matter how far appart, in the spatial metric, two gaussian packets get, their corresponding states will remain at an almost constant distance in the Hilbert space. If the Hilbert distance is such a lousy measure of how different two states are, it is not clear why, without a BLR, should we expect it to be a good measure of similarity.
Moreover, in EQM the Hilbert metric appears only in the requirement of unitarity, which might be interpreted as simply requiring the preservation of orthogonality, with distances being an irrelevant artifact of the mathematical formalism.
The role of orthogonality
Usually, orthogonal states are seen as mutually exclusive, in the sense that they can be eigenvectors for different values of an observable, and the measurement of one of them will never give the other value as a result. But this is another consequence of the Born Rule, which uses orthogonal projections to define the Born weights.
By C3, in EQM orthogonality may lose its usual significance. So, for example, if |0 and |1 are orthonormal states, and |+ = (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2, it is not clear why, in EQM, the measurement of |0 = √ 2 |+ − |1 could not give result |1 in some branches.
This causes yet more problems for decoherence, as even perfect orthogonality of Ω1 and Ω2 in (4) becomes meaningless.
Wallace's "Formal proof of the Born rule"
In this section we provide a detailed analysis and criticism of Wallace's most recent attempt ([Wal10b, Wal12]) to formalize Deutsch's ideas. His work is an elaborate mix of concepts from EQM and Decision Theory, and, to ease the reader into it, he starts with an informal description and justification of the axioms and proof, followed by a more formal presentation. Unfortunately, at times this last part becomes a maze of definitions and notations, bearing little resemblance to his previous explanations. Expressing quantum ideas in a language closer to Decision Theory has taken its toll, making the notation clumsier, and letting concepts appear less troublesome than they really are. Also, comprehension of the intricacies of his work has not been helped by a somewhat inconsistent notation, and some ambiguities that can lead the reader astray.
We try to provide a new presentation of his proof, suggestions to improve it, and some criticism of what might be more serious problems. Although we follow the same general lines, some changes were made, which, in our opinion, clarify it without affecting the result. In particular, we stick to the familiar quantum language, to remove a layer of complexity, and to keep us from accepting a result just because a decision theoretic terminology makes it sound reasonable.
Basic definitions
Wallace defines a quantum decision problem as being specified by:
• A separable Hilbert space H.
• A collection E of subspaces of H, closed under the operations 3 of conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and complement ⊥, and with H ∈ E .
• A partition R of H (a partition of E ∈ E is a set of mutually orthogonal elements of E whose disjunction is E).
• A subset M ⊂ E such that any E ∈ E has a partition in elements of M.
• For each E ∈ E , a set UE of unitary operators from E into H.
4
A solution to the problem is given by a preference order ≻ ψ , for each state ψ belonging to some M ∈ M. This is an order on UM , satisfying some axioms to be defined later. This notation is ambiguous when ψ is in more than one M ∈ M, but, as ≻ ψ,M would be too cumbersome, Wallace leaves M implicit. However, as his MacIndif axiom implies this order does not depend on ψ but only on M , a better notation might have been ≻M .
Notation. To keep notations simple and consistent, we adopt the convention that:
• ψ, φ, ϕ are always used for states;
• M , N for elements of M;
• r, s, t for elements of R;
• E, F for elements of E ;
• U , V , W , X for elements of some UE.
• an index n has values 1 or 2, while i runs over an arbitrary index set.
• ΠE denotes the orthogonal projection into E.
• OU represents the smallest E ∈ E containing the range of U .
5
As usual in formal settings, the proof should hold regardless of any intuitive meaning attributed to these elements. So there is no specification of which subspaces should be in E , R or M, or which operators should be in each UE. They just have to satisfy all axioms (so their meaning is derived from the axioms).
However, the justification for the axioms depends on how we interpret these symbols. So, in the informal part of his text, Wallace describes the quantum decision problem as one in which, in an Everettian Universe, a system prepared in some initial state is to be measured in some basis. Some bets are available, giving, in each branch, a certain payoff depending on the result of the measurement. And an Everettian agent (i.e. someone who knows EQM as correctly describing his Universe, and knows the Born weights of that state in the measurement basis) has to decide which bets he prefers. In this setting, H should be the Hilbert space of all quantum states of the total system of interest, which in EQM includes the macroscopic elements (agent, measuring device, payoffs, etc.).
Macrostates
The elements of M are called macrostates. If ψ = i ψi with ψi ∈ Mi, we say that ψ has a branch decomposition in the macrostates {Mi}, with the ψi's being its branches.
Wallace states that macrostates are largely determined by decoherence, depending on a choice of fineness of the coarse graining. But, as discussed in section 3.3, it might not be justifiable to use decoherence before one has a BLR. Macrostates could also be seen as sets of macroscopically similar states, but physically there is no clear measure of similarity, so again there is a degree of arbitrariness in their choice. In his model, Wallace assumes an idealized situation, in which the agent has a clearly defined set M to consider.
The simplest case to work with would be if the following condition was valid.
Orthogonal Macrostates (OrthMacr). Distinct macrostates are mutually orthogonal.
However, fuzziness in the separation of macrostates makes this a little too artificial. The relation between elements of a macrostate is not a real equivalence, just a similarity, so distinct macrostates M1 and M2 might even have nonzero intersection.
In his informal discussion, Wallace only considers the case in which OrthMacr is valid, but the formal part includes no such condition, allowing for extreme possibilities such as M = {H} or M = {all subspaces of H}. These do not make sense intuitively, but, as the formal definition does not exclude them, all arguments should be analyzed considering that alternatives like these remain on the table. On the other hand, Wallace uses results depending implicitly on OrthMacr, so maybe it should be added as an axiom.
Note that with OrthMacr the branch decomposition of a state is unique, so its number of branches becomes well defined, being only as artificial as the choice of M upon which the agent will base his decision.
Without it, not only a quantum state can represent a superposition of macroscopic realities, but these would not even be uniquely defined, leading us back to the Preferred Basis Problem. Intuitively, one would hope that different decompositions of the same state would consist of relatively similar branches, but there does not seem to be anything in EQM to guarantee that. If two macrostates represent very distinct physical situations, they should be almost orthogonal, with perfect orthogonality in many cases. But, in a high dimensional Hilbert space, even tiny deviations from orthogonality are enough to allow a state ψ of some macrostate to be decomposed into a large number of very different branches.
Events
An element of E is called an event, and intuitively it is the subspace of all states satisfying some given conditions. For example, we can have an event E formed by all states in which an electron is in a given energy eigenstate, or an event F of all states in which the agent wears a white shirt.
In quantum logic [EGL09] , operations ∧, ∨, ⊥ play roles similar to AND, OR, NOT in classical logic. But there are important differences, as for example the distributive law fails: if Su, S d and Sr are, respectivelly, the events of an electron having spin up, down, and to the right, then
The reason for using the disjunction ∨ instead of the union ∪ of events is due to the way quantum measurements work: the set of states in which the result of a spin measurement can be 'up' OR 'down' is not just Su ∪ S d , but also includes all superpositions of states of Su and S d . Similarly, even if a state is not in Su, as long as it is not orthogonal to this subspace the spin measurement can still result 'up'. Hence the negation of E is not the whole set theoretic complement, but only its orthogonal complement E ⊥ . If E and F are mutually orthogonal, they are mutually exclusive in the sense that, if a state of E is tested for the defining condition of F , the result will always be false, and vice versa. Classically, this means no state can present both conditions, but in quantum mechanics we have superpositions of states of E and F , which when tested can result in both alternatives (although only one will be seen in each branch).
Partitioning an event means describing it in terms of mutually exclusive subevents. Any E is required to have a partition in macrostates, so we can think of events as disjunctions of macrostates satisfying a given condition, and ψ ∈ E if it can be decomposed in branches having such condition.
If OrthMacr is valid, partitions in macrostates are unique. Moreover, ΠF E = E ∧ F for any E, F , and E ⊥ F ⇔ E ∧ F = {0}. Wallace uses these interchangeably at times, which is not justifiable if his formalism allows for non-orthogonal macrostates.
Note that, as discussed in section 3.4, in EQM it is not clear whether orthogonality plays its usual role. So, even though we can treat quantum logic abstractly, it is not clear why the agent should take it into consideration, as there seems to be no link between the algebra of orthogonal projectors and what he observes experimentally.
Rewards
Elements of R are events called rewards. Wallace does not elaborate much, saying that they are . . . a coarse-graining of the macrostate subspaces . . . such that an agent's only preference is to which reward subspace she is in. [Wal12, p. 165] So we depend on his use of the concept to reveal more about its meaning. Two possible characterizations of R can be identified, the first reflecting the terminology, and the second corresponding to the above description.
Rewards as Payoffs (RePay).
To each payoff of a bet there corresponds some r ∈ R, consisting of all superpositions of states in which the agent received that payoff.
Rewards as Preferences (RePref ).
Reward subspaces should be set up in such a way that the agent will be completely indifferent between two states of the same r.
Wallace seems to alternate between these two, which may be incompatible. Suppose some bets give a $10 payoff in certain cases. If RePay is valid, there is a single r ∈ R corresponding to it, which we label as r ="$10 payoff". As in EQM quantum states include the agent, such r will contain events reflecting all possible circumstances leading to this payoff, as each history produces a different state of the agent's memory. This conflicts with RePref, as for example receiving this payoff in a time consuming bet might be less preferable than in a fast one. RePref would require the event "$10 payoff" to be partitioned in several rewards: r1 ="$10 payoff on a quick bet A", r2 ="$10 payoff on bet B, with the agent doing an extra experiment", and so on. Actually, for each r we would have to list every single factor that might influence the agent's preference, possibly making the a priori determination of R unfeasible.
Another way to have RePref would be to define R a posteriori, in terms of ≻. Apparently, this was Wallace's initial idea, as he states that reward subspace is a derived concept ([Wal10b, p.234], removed in [Wal12] ). But this would lead to difficulties with axioms refering to rewards, as any characterization of R would depend on properties of ≻ we are trying to deduce.
Perhaps a compromise could be reached, by allowing the choice of reward subspaces to involve just a few other factors besides payoffs, and imposing a somewhat artificial condition that the agent should take only these into account in his decision. However, if this is not dealt with carefully, we may end up forcing the agent not to care about certain factors, like branchings that preserve the payoff, before we even conclude whether it is reasonable to do so.
Another problem is that, by describing R as a coarse-graining of M, Wallace seems to imply that every M will be in some r, and at points he seems to use it implicitly. If OrthMacr holds this is true, as R is a partition of H, and each r has a partition in macrostates. Without OrthMacr, it is not even clear why should we require rewards to be perfectly orthogonal 6 to each other.
Acts
Elements of UE are acts available at E. Intuitivelly, an act might be, for example, preparation of a quantum state, its measurement, placing a bet, receiving a payoff, or any other action(s) of interest. Availability of an act depends on E, e.g. the act of deciding a bet will only be available in events in which that bet has been placed.
In EQM, even macroscopic actions correspond to quantum evolution operators, so for a closed system it is natural to use unitary operators. However, if decoherence is used to define M, we have to consider the system in relation to the environment. This requires a different formalism, with density matrices instead of states, and evolution operators that might not be unitary.
As the range U (E) might not be an event, Wallace uses OU , the smallest event containing it. A partition OU =∨iMi gives for any φ ∈ U (E) a branch decomposition in terms of the Mi's. Wallace seems to treat these as the only possible branches resulting from the act, but, if OrthMacr is not valid, φ might even have a branch in some M / ∈ OU . At a branched state there are many versions of the agent, each acting on his own branch Mi. In EQM their individual acts Ui ∈ UM i must be restrictions of a single U ∈ U∨ i M i . Unitarity implies that, being the Mi's mutually orthogonal, so must be their images Ui(Mi). Hence the acts in the different branches must somehow be correlated, threatening the free will of the agent's versions. What might save it is that, if two macrostates represent very distinct physical situations, most physically reasonable evolutions of them will preserve enough differences to almost maintain orthogonality. Then small adjustments of the Ui's might be enough to attain perfect orthogonality.
Wallace mentions that contemplatable might be a better term than available. This distinction is important, allowing us to exclude acts which are irrelevant to the decision problem, and include some which are not feasible, but which the agent might want to include in his considerations as if they were possible. Actually, inclusion of physically impossible acts is unavoidable. As EQM is deterministic, there is always only one possible act, determined by the Hamiltonian of the whole macroscopic system. Even the choices of the agent are predetermined, eliminating any possibility of free will, as the act of choosing might at best correspond to a branching into all possible decisions. Taken to the last consequences, this might compromise any attempt at mixing EQM and Decision Theory. Of course, determinism in Classical Mechanics has never kept anybody from worrying about decisions, which can be considered abstractly, as if the agent could choose what to do. Classically, that is easy to do, as the agent can be treated as somewhat detached from the process. In EQM this might not be so simple, for if we want to consider how the branching caused by the bet affects the agent, he has to be included in the dynamics of the system.
Axioms and further definitions
Wallace's axioms are organized in two sets: Richness Axioms, which guarantee the agent has a good selection of acts to choose from, and Rationality Axioms, which guide his choice. We give somewhat informal statements, and refer to [Wal10b] or [Wal12] for more details.
Richness axioms
These are conditions on the sets UE. Wallace's Continuation axiom was excluded, as any E having UE = ∅ can simply be removed from the decision problem. We also replaced some of the axioms (ReAv, BrAv, and Eras) by weaker versions, restricted to non-branched states, and added a new one (Compat) to extend them to multiple branches. The reason is that, while Wallace's formal axioms include branched states, he justifies them only for single branches, and the transition is not so trivial.
Indolence (Indol).1E ∈ UE for any E.
Restriction (Restr). If F ⊂ E and U ∈ UE then U |F ∈ UF .
Composition (Compos). If U ∈ UE and V ∈ UO U then V U ∈ UE.
These are straightforward. We combined Wallace's Continuation and Indolence axioms into a single one, as events with no available acts can simply be excluded from the decision problem.
Wallace is not very explicit in justifying this axiom, but it seems the idea is to avoid recoherence, i.e. the agent's versions should not be able to act in such a way that causes their distinct branches to merge, as this might violate thermodynamical irreversibility. However, by C3, we can not assume EQM is compatible with the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Suppose a state has branches ϕi in orthogonal, but not too different, macrostates. Even if forcing these branches to merge is beyond the agent's capabilities, new branchings occur all the time, generating all possible developments of the ϕi's, so it is conceivable that some common branches might appear naturally. And without a BLR we can not say it happens only in a negligible amount of worlds.
Another problem is that, if OrthMacr is not valid, O U | E ⊥ O U | F might not guarantee absence of common branches, as there could be alternative branching decompositions, with components outside these sets.
Problem Continuity (PrCont). Each UE is an open set in the operator norm topology.
So if U is available, all acts sufficiently close to it will also be available. Wallace's justification for this is physical imprecision, as the agent can not have absolute control over every microscopic detail of his actions.
However, requiring UE to be open may be too strong. The image of φ by all acts in a small radius around U will include all states (of equal norm) in a small radius around U φ. So, for any state ϕ and any ǫ > 0 small enough, there is some unitary operator Uǫ, very close to U , such that Uǫφ = U φ + ǫϕ (with proper normalization, of course). This is troublesome, because the Hilbert space is full of physically unreasonable states, like some ϕ in which the agent has disintegrated. And, as discussed before, Macrostate discontinuities mean we can not assume ǫϕ is negligible.
To avoid such problems, we should require UE to be open only in some subset of physically reasonable acts. As discussed in section 4.1.4, strict enforcement of physical laws would leave us with only a single available act. So it would be necessary to specify which perturbations of U are acceptable, and which ones are too unreasonable, but it is not clear how this could be done.
Reward Availability (ReAv). For any M and r, there is U ∈ UM such that OU ⊂ r.
Wallace's justification is that we can always consider an act in which the agent is simply handed any given payoff. But this only means his state can be sent into any r if RePay is valid.
Branching Availability (BrAv)
This is explained by the possibility of preparing and measuring a quantum system, with the sole purpose of causing the desired branching.
Wallace's argument is that, once the agent receives the payoff, he can effectively erase all evidence of how he got it (i.e., through which result, of which bet). As the agent is part of the quantum system, this might not be so easy, for it would entail erasing his memory of the bet. But, as discussed in section 4.1.4, maybe we can consider such erasure act as if it were feasible.
He also describes U1 and U2 as taking ψ1 and ψ2, even if they are in distinct macrostates of the same r, into a single erasure subspace er, whose states have lost all information about the bets. If RePay is not valid, it is not clear why this er should remain in r.
To explain why U1ψ1 and U2ψ2 are not simply in er, but are actually equal, Wallace says that, as the agent . . . lacks the fine control to know which act he is performing, all erasures should be counted as available if any are. [Wal12, p.167] Apparently, what he means is that, if there is an erasure act taking ψ into some ϕ ∈ er, there will be other acts taking it to any otherφ ∈ er, because the agent has no precise control of the final microstate. In such case, it is easy to obtain U1ψ1 = U2ψ2 (of course, the agent will not be able to execute precisely these acts, but knowing they exist is enough).
But this argument fails if er has more than one macrostate, and, even if that is not the case, not being able to take ψ precisely to ϕ is not akin to possibly taking it to anyφ. Even if we can erase information at a macroscopic level, it remains hidden microscopically, so there can be no overlap between the sets of microstates of er to which ψ1 and ψ2 can be taken.
One might say that the agent can think about such erasure acts as if they were physically possible. But, as we keep on relaxing the physical laws that should constrain the agent's considerations, one has to wonder whether his decision remains sufficiently grounded in the conditions of an Everettian Universe, that it can reveal anything about its physics.
Wallace omits the condition |ψ1| = |ψ2|, which is necessary as the Un's are unitary. That would not be the case if, in order to use decoherence, the system were treated as open. But in such case this axiom would become so strong that the Equivalence Lemma would hold without any conditions on the norms, effectivelly rendering the Born weights irrelevant.
Compatibility (Compat). Acts Ui ∈ UM i , obtained on mutually orthogonal macrostates Mi via Indol, ReAv, BrAv or Eras, can be chosen with mutually orthogonal images, so that Ui = U |M i for some U ∈ U∨ i M i .
Intuitively, we would expect acts on different branches to be independent of each other. But, as discussed in section 4.1.4, their images must be orthogonal. This axiom assumes that the kinds of acts described in the aforementioned axioms can always be replaced by similar ones satisfying this condition, so that they can be restrictions of a global U available aṫ ∨iMi.
This may not be so easy for erasure acts, as the condition U1ψ1 = U2ψ2 in Eras might not be preserved by small perturbations in the Un's, unless they can be adjusted in tandem. And if this were possible, combining these acts into a U ∈ U M 1∨ M 2 would contradict Irrev.
Rationality axioms
These are conditions the agent's preference orders ≻ ψ must satisfy in order to be considered rational solutions to the decision problem.
Ordering (Ord). For each ψ ∈ M , ≻ ψ is a total order on UM .
It corresponds to the axioms of Completeness and Transitivity from Classical Decision Theory.
Act Nondegeneracy (ActNDeg). There are ψ ∈ M and U, V ∈ UM such that U ≻ ψ V . This ensures there is at least one situation in which the agent has a strict preference for an act over another. Wallace omits this axiom, but assumes its consequence, the Reward Nondegeneracy Lemma, mentioning that in cases when it is not valid his result holds trivially. Although that is true, we prefer to obtain that lemma from this more basic axiom.
Branching Indifference (BrIndif ). Given ψ ∈ M ⊂ r and U ∈ UM , if U is a branching act then U ∼ ψ1M .
Our formalization of this axiom is different from Wallace's, but we believe it reflects more accurately his informal idea, described as follows.
An agent doesn't care about branching per se: if a certain operation leaves his future selves in N different macrostates but doesn't change any of their rewards, he is indifferent as to whether or not the operation is performed. [Wal12, p.170] This only seems reasonable due to the ambiguity of the term rewards. If RePay is valid, branchings that do not alter payoffs will preserve r, but the agent's preferences might vary inside such subspace. If RePref is valid, the agent will be indifferent to processes that preserve r, but branchings might change r (and the definition of branching acts in BrAv would not have OU ⊂ r).
This axiom is central to Wallace's proof, implying the amount of branches is irrelevant to the decision. He further justifies it by saying that, as the number of branches is undefined and unpredictable branchings occur all the time, decisions taking them into account would be impossibly complicated. So this is a necessary condition if rational decisions are to be possible.
But, as noted in section 3.1, we can not exclude the possibility of some estimate of the amount of branches. Indeed, as discussed in section 4.1.1, a choice of M with OrthMacr would actually determine a choice of branch counting. And even if the agent can not take into account all possible branchings, he might, like a chess player, consider those he can anticipate, perhaps weighting them differently depending on their macroscopic significance or how far in the future they are.
Lastly, by C3, we have to admit that rational decisions might simply not be possible in an Everettian Universe. Wallace's response to this is that there is at least one rational decision strategy, the Born Strategy. But this is a circular argument, as such strategy is only considered rational because it satisfies his axioms, which have to be justified first.
Wallace's original formalization of Branching Indifference is actually a much stronger statement, which we rename as the following axiom.
Reward Supervenience (ReSup). Given ψ ∈ M ⊂ r and U ∈ UM , if U ψ ∈ r then U ∼ ψ1M .
Here there is no hypothesis on the nature of U , so all acts preserving r are equally preferred, reflecting the idea of RePref. But, as discussed, perhaps RePref can not be assumed from the start, so it might not serve as justification. On the other hand, this axiom, if justified, can be combined with Eras and StaSup (these are needed as there might be ψ, ψ ′ ∈ r with no available U connecting them) to obtain RePref.
Note that if RePay is valid (so branching acts preserve r), ReSup implies BrIndif.
This axiom is only used in Wallace's proof with branchings and erasure acts. So, instead of it, we use our version of BrIndif and the next axiom.
Erasure Indifference (ErIndif ). Given ψ ∈ M ⊂ r and U ∈ UM , if U is an erasure act then U ∼ ψ1M .
Being less general than ReSup, this might be easier to justify. However, unless RePref is valid, nothing in the acts defined in Eras seems to guarantee the agent's indifference to them, specially if they involve erasing part of his memory.
State Supervenience (StaSup). If ψn ∈ Mn and Un, Vn ∈ UM n , with U1ψ1 = U2ψ2 and V1ψ1 = V2ψ2,
This means the decision should be based only on the final states, not on which action led to it or what was the initial state. In particular,
Wallace argues that, if U and V take the system from ψ to the same final state ϕ, they only differ by their effect on states other than the actual one, which the agent should not care about. But, as he notes, this could be a limitation of the formalism, which omits any description of the evolution process. An alternative would be to use consistent histories, but he dismisses it due to the arbitrariness of temporal gaps between history projectors and of their coarse grainings, and because he is only considering decisions made over short periods of time. But there is no reason why the process should be described in semi-classical terms. As we assume the agent is capable of working with quantum descriptions of macroscopic systems, we might as well describe the whole process in terms of time dependent evolution operators U (t).
Wallace does not explain why the initial state is irrelevant. Suppose the agent has a choice of two acts, one giving a $10,000 payoff, the other leading to a superposition of a $0 branch and a $1,000,000 one. Even not knowing the Born weights or if they have any relevance, we can not ignore the possibility that the agent's attitude towards this choice might be influenced by whether he had initially $0 (and might find $10,000 with no $0 branches very tempting) or $1,000,000 (in which case he might consider $10,000 as bad as $0).
Perhaps a better justification is that the agent is part of the quantum system, so the final state includes his memories of the bet and of his initial state. Acts leading to the same final memory probably differ only on aspects that were insignificant to the agent, not influencing his decision. This argument, however, would not work for erasure acts, if they involve erasing the agent's memory, as discussed in Eras.
Note that this axiom could be used to define a partial order on states: φ ≻ ϕ if there are ψ ∈ M and U, V ∈ UM such that U ψ = φ, V ψ = ϕ, and U ≻ ψ V . This would simplify many statements, but we do not use it to avoid deviating too much from Wallace's work.
Macrostate Indifference (MacIndif ). If ψn ∈ Mn and Un, Vn ∈ UM n , with OU n ⊂ M ∧ r and
In particular, if ψ1 and ψ2 are in the same macrostate M1 = M2, some U takes both into a single M ∧ r, and some V takes them into another M ′ ∧ r ′ , the axiom states that U ≻ ψ 1 V ⇔ U ≻ ψ 2 V , i.e. the preference between U and V does not depend on the specific microstates. Wallace justification is that decisions can not depend on all microscopic details of the situation, as the agent has no such fine control. This is built into the idea of macrostates: if two states are different enough to affect the agent's preferences, they should be in distinct macrostates.
But this formal statement is much stronger, allowing M1 = M2, so preferences can not even depend on the initial macrostates. Nor on acts, as taking ψ1 = ψ2, M = M ′ , r = r ′ , U1 = V2 and U2 = V1, one deduces that all acts sending a state into M ∧ r are equally preferred. Basically, the preference between acts, whose images are contained in sets of the form M ∧ r, depends only on such sets. The initial states or macrostates, and even the acts themselves, are irrelevant. All this requires further justification, which could go along the lines of StaSup.
It is not clear why Wallace uses M ∧r. If OrthMacr is valid, M ∧r = {0} implies M ∧ r = M . Informally, this is expected, for if all states of M are macroscopically similar, it does not make sense for only some to be in r. But, as discussed in section 4.1, macrostates and rewards are not so well characterized yet. Using M in place of M ∧ r in this axiom might actually be a step in such direction, if RePref is valid.
Wallace's only 8 uses this axiom to define the Order on Rewards, saying that MacIndif, ReSup and ReAv imply it is a total order. This requires proving preferences depend not on M ∧ r, but only on r, i.e. proving RePref. He does not give details, but it seems ReSup is to be used to extend the equivalence of preferences from M ∧ r to the whole r (it would also require DiacCons). But, as not all states of r might be connected via some U , this would not be enough. We obtained Order on Rewards by other means, and did not use MacIndif for anything.
Diachronic Consistency (DiacCons
Wallace's Diachronic Consistency mixes two ideas, which for clarity we separate into axioms DiacCons and BrCons. For this first one, assume for the moment that ϕ = U ψ belongs to some macrostate, so ≻ϕ is well defined. His justification for this property is that it . . . rules out the possibility of a conflict of interest between an agent and his future selves. . . An agent's actions take time to carry out. . . If his preferences do not remain consistent over this timescale, deliberative action is not possible at all. [Wal12, p.168] For example, if at first the agent prefers a composite act V U to another V ′ U , but after doing U he changes his mind and decides to do V ′ instead of V , he will end up at what was initially his least preferred result. Of course, people change their minds, but, to be able to decide, the agent has to suppose he knows how he will behave along the way. If new factors come up leading him to a different course of action, it does not change the fact that his initial decision might have been the most reasonable one, in face of the available information at the time.
But if this happens all the time, decisions become an exercise in futility. We know that in our universe this is not such an ubiquitous problem, but, by C3, we can not assume the same to hold in an Everettian Universe. Wallace's defense is that DiacCons in necessary for rational decisions to be possible, so, as the Born Strategy is rational, this property must be valid. Again, this is a circular argument. However, if one accepts StaSup, it implies DiacCons 9 .
Definition (Accessible States). We say that ϕ ∈ E is accessible from ψ ∈ M using U ∈ UM if OU ⊂ E and U ψ = ϕ.
So a state is accessible if it can be reached by an act starting at a non-branched state. Most states of interest should be accessible, if the decision problem starts at a macrostate. So far, ≻ ψ is only defined at non-branched states, but we extend it to all accessible states, in a way consistent with DiacCons.
Definition (Order at Accessible States). If ϕ ∈ E is accessible from ψ ∈ M using U ∈ UM , we write V ≻ϕ
By StaSup, ≻ϕ does not depend on ψ, M or U , and by Ord it is a total order. If ϕ ∈ M , it is trivially accessible, and ≻ϕ coincides with the original order.
So (E, ϕ) is null if, at ϕ, the agent is indifferent to what happens on E, as long as it does not affect its complement. Note that, while in classical decision theory acts on an event and on its complement are independent, in the quantum case they are connected, as U (E ⊥ ) ⊥ U (E) by unitarity. Two usefull properties are:
Nul2. If (E, ϕ) and (F, ϕ) are null then (E ∨ F, ϕ) is null.
Branch Consistency (BrCons). Given an accessible
Wallace does not provide much explanation for this property 11 , but its idea is similar to the classical Independence condition. It relates the order on a branched state to the preferences in the individual branches, at least when all the agent's versions agree. If in all branches of ϕ the action corresponding to V is preferred or equivalent to the one given by V ′ , then V is preferred or equivalent to V ′ , and it becomes a strict preference if it is so in at least one branch (as long as it is a branch the agent cares about, i.e. non-null).
If OrthMacr is not valid, E might admit other partitions in macrostates, as discussed in section 4.1.1, giving other decompositions of ϕ into branches that can be physically very different from the ϕi's. In these new branches the agent's preferences might be different, leading to V ′ ≻ϕ V . To avoid this contradiction, we have to prove that if in one decomposition all agent's versions agree that the restriction of V is preferable to the one of V ′ , then the same happens in any other decomposition, no matter how physically different. But there does not seem to be any reason for this to be true.
Wallace includes the hypothesis U ′ , V ′ ∈ UM , which is unnecessary if one accepts PrCont, and ψ ∈ M , which is no longer needed as we extended the definition of ≻ ψ .
This axiom means preferences should not change if an act is replaced by a very similar one. This is necessary as, by C4, we can not assume the agent can distinguish arbitrarily similar acts, nor that he can execute them with microscopic precision. However, as discussed before, Macrostate discontinuities allow even small changes in U to introduce completely new branches which, being non-negligible, might affect the decision. In such conditions, lack of fine control may simply mean that rational decision is not possible in an Everettian Universe.
Proof
We analyze Wallace's proof assuming all problems with the axioms can be fixed. We reorganized it with a more explicit notation, filled in details and pointed out some obscure points, but the idea is essentially the same. To facilitate modifications, we tried to be explicit in the use of axioms, with the exceptions of Restr, Indol, Compos, and Ord, which are quite simple and ubiquitous.
In this section we use normalized states, but only to simplify the notation. The reader is invited to check that nowhere the assumption of |φ| = 1 is related to any probabilistic interpretation, and the proof remains valid if φ is replaced by φ |φ| . The first lemma shows the preference between acts (on macrostates) depends only on the norm of the components of the final states on each reward. As before, the index n assumes values 1 or 2. We also writeñ = 2 if n = 1, and vice-versa.
Equivalence Lemma. Let ψn ∈ Mn and Un, Vn ∈ UM n . If, for all r 12 , |ΠrU1ψ1| = |ΠrU2ψ2| and |ΠrV1ψ1| = |ΠrV2ψ2|,
Proof. Let ϕn = Unψn and ϕn,r = Πrϕn. In this proof, the index r runs over elements of R for which ϕn,r = 0. Let En,r be the smallest event containing ΠrOU n 13 , and En =˙ r En,r. Given a partition {M 
12 Wallace requires finitely many with nonzero norm, necessary if BrAv is accepted only in the finite case. For our purposes, it is enough to assume R is finite. 13 Wallace uses O U ∧ r as if it were ΠrO U , implicitly assuming OrthMacr. for i ∈ In,r and j ∈ Iñ,r, and
, so by BrCons Xn ∼ φn1O Wn . Also, X1φ1 = X2φ2.
Corollary 2. Let ϕ ∈ E be accessible and U, V ∈ UE. If |ΠrU ϕ| = |ΠrV ϕ| for all r then U ∼ϕ V .
The preference on acts induces, via Corollary 1, another one on rewards 14 , which by ReAv and Ord will be a total order on R.
Definition (Order on Rewards). We write r ≻ s if U ≻ ψ V , for ψ ∈ E and U, V ∈ UE such that U ψ ∈ r, V ψ ∈ s.
In his proof, Wallace assumes the next result, as a simple requirement to have a nontrivial decision problem. However, as order on rewards is derived from order on acts, we deduce its nondegeneracy from the more fundamental ActNDeg axiom.
Reward Nondegeneracy Lemma. There are r, s such that r ≻ s.
Proof. Fix s ∈ R, and suppose r ∼ s for all r. By ActNDeg, there are ψ ∈ M and U, V ∈ UM such that U ≻ ψ V . Taking a partition of each r ∈ R into macrostates, let {Mi} be the set of all such macrostates with ϕi = ΠM i U ψ = 0. By ReAv, for each i there is Wi ∈ UM i with OW i ⊂ s. As Mi is in some r ∼ s, by Order on Rewards Wi ∼ϕ i1 M i . By Compat, there is W ∈ UO U such that W |M i = Wi, and BrCons implies W ∼ U ψ1O U . Then W U ψ ∈ s, and W U ∼ ψ U by DiacCons. By the same argument, we obtain
Definition (Extremal Rewards
We assume, for simplicity, the existence of such rewards, and by the previous Lemma we can, from now on, fix two of them with r0 ≺ r1. The proof can be generalized to work without this assumption, but we do not do so, as our goal is just to obtain the Born weights, not to develop a Quantum Decision Theory in all its generality.
The next lemma proves that the only way the agent will not care about some event is if there are no branches there. Wallace's proof of it seems incomplete, so we try to fill in the gaps.
Nullity Lemma. (E, ψ) is a Null Pair if and only if ΠEψ = 0.
Now suppose (E, ψ) is null but ΠEψ = 0. As E has a partition in macrostates, there is M ⊂ E with |ΠM ψ| 2 = α = 0. Using ReAv and Compat, we can construct U, V ∈ UH such that OU ⊂ r0, V (M ) ⊂ r1, and
However, BrCons and Order on Rewards would imply
is null, so the nullity condition for macrostates is solely determined by the norm of the projection.
For any N ∈ N such that 1/N < α, BrAv gives φ and U such that OU = M1∨M2∨M3 and
As |Π M 1∨ M 2 U φ| 2 = α, by the previous result (M1∨M2, U φ) is null. By Nul1, (M1, U φ) is also null, hence so will be any (
Using BrAv again, we get another φ and U with OU = M1∨ . . .∨MN and |ΠM i U φ| 2 = 1/N for all i. Hence all (Mi, U φ) are null, and by Nul2 so is (OU , U φ). By ReAv and Compat, there are V, W ∈ UO U such that OV ⊂ r1 and OW ⊂ r0. By the Order on Rewards, V ≻ U φ W , contradicting the nullity of (OU , U φ).
Definition (Standard Act). U is standard of weight α at ψ if U ψ ∈ r0∨ r1 and |Πr 1 U ψ| 2 = α.
By the Equivalence Lemma, preference between standard acts is uniquely determined by their weights, and the next result shows that it increases with the weight. It is similar to the classical Monotonicity condition, with weights in place of probabilities. Dominance Lemma. Let Uα and U β be standard acts of weights α and β, respectively, at ψ. Then α > β ⇔ Uα ≻ ψ U β .
Proof. If α > β then, by BrAv, there are ϕ and U such that OU = M1∨M2∨M3 and |φ1| 2 = β,
where φi = ΠM i φ for φ = U ϕ. By ReAv and Compat, there are V, W ∈ UO U such that
By the Order on Rewards,
, and the Nullity Lemma implies (M2, φ) is not null. So V ≻ φ W by BrCons, and DiacCons implies V U ≻ϕ W U . As V U and W U are also standard acts of weights α and β, respectively, at ϕ, the Equivalence Lemma
The rest of the proof is similar to VNM, and we organize it differently from Wallace's.
Utility Lemma. There is a unique 15 u : R → [0, 1] (called a utility function) with u(r0) = 0, u(r1) = 1, and such that, if U ψ ∈ r and V is standard of weight u(r) at ψ, then U ∼ ψ V . Moreover, u(r) > u(s) ⇔ r ≻ s.
Proof. By BrAv and ReAv, for any ψ ∈ M , r ∈ R and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 there are Ur, Vα ∈ UM such that Urψ ∈ r and Vα is standard of weight α at ψ. By the Equivalence Lemma, the definition u(r) = sup{α : Vα ψ Ur}, does not depend on the choice of ψ, Ur or Vα. Then Vα ≻ ψ Ur for all α > u(r), and by the Dominance Lemma Vα ≺ ψ Ur for all α < u(r).
Suppose V u(r) ≻ ψ Ur. Then u(r) > 0, as V0 ≻ ψ Ur would imply r0 ≻ r by Order on Rewards. By SolCont, V ≻ ψ Ur for any V in some neighborhood of V u(r) . For α < u(r) close enough to u(r), we can assume Vα is in this neighborhood (using PrCont, if necessary, to choose another Vα as a perturbation of V u(r) ), so that Vα ≻ ψ Ur, which gives a contradiction. By the same argument it is not possible to have V u(r) ≺ ψ Ur. Hence V u(r) ∼ ψ Ur, and by the Equivalence Lemma the same holds for any acts satisfying the conditions of the lemma.
Also, u(r) > u(s) ⇔ Ur ∼ ψ V u(r) ≻ ψ V u(s) ∼ ψ Us ⇔ r ≻ s, by the Dominance Lemma, Ord and the Order on Rewards. To prove unicity, let u be another utility function. If U ψ ∈ r then Vũ (r) ∼ ψ U ∼ ψ V u(r) , and by the Dominance Lemmaũ(r) = u(r).
Definition (Expected Utility). The expected utility of U at ψ is
Standard Act Lemma. Let ψ ∈ M and U ∈ UM . Then U ∼ ψ U ′ for a standard act U ′ of weight EU ψ (U ) at ψ.
Proof. For each r let {M By BrCons W ∼ϕ1H, so by DiacCons
Proof. By the Standard Act Lemma, U and V are equivalent to standard acts U ′ , V ′ of weights equal to their expected utilities, so the result is a consequence of the Dominance Lemma.
This coincides with how classical agents decide on bets with probabilities equal to these Born weights. Wallace interprets it as evidence that such weights can be seen as subjective probabilities.
Comparison with the classical cases
The many technical details of the proof can hide the idea behind it, so in this section we discuss it in comparison with classical decision theory (Appendix A). For simplicity, we consider only three rewards r0 ≺ r ≺ r1, and set utilities u(r0) = 0 and u(r1) = 1 as reference values.
In the classical case of Decision under Risk, consider standard bets Bp in which the agent receives r1 with probability p, otherwise receives r0. Assuming the agent's preference for such bets increases continuously with p, there will be some value pr for which the bet Bp r will seem as good to the agent as receiving r with certainty. This value is taken to be a measure of the agent's interest in r (in comparison with r0 and r1), and is called its utility u(r).
Consider now an arbitrary bet A, giving r0, r or r1 with probabilities α0, αr and α1 (resp.). As the agent is indifferent between r and Bp r , he should also be indifferent between A and another bet A ′ , identical to A except that the event that would lead to the reward r now leads to a second bet Bp r . The rules of classical probability imply A ′ is equivalent to the standard bet Bα r pr +α 1 . Hence αrpr + α1, which equals the expected utility, measures the agent's interest in A.
Decision under Uncertainty is similar, but the probabilities of events leading to each reward are unknown. It is reduced to the previous case by determining the agent's belief about such probabilities. Roughly speaking, to do so we assume it is possible to generate a number of events the agent considers so unlikely that his preferences are little affected by what happens in any one of them, and without loss of generality we can assume the agent considers them all equally likely. Suppose, for example, this is done using a roulette with n numbers, and define standard bets Bm giving r1 for m numbers and r0 for the others. As m increases, the rewards of some results improves, so the agent's preference for such bets also increases gradually. Given an arbitrary event E, let A be a bet giving r1 in case of E and r0 otherwise. If the agent becomes indifferent between A and Bm when m reaches a certain value, his subjective probability for E is m n . In the quantum case, let a standard bet Bw be one in which the spin of an electron, prepared with Born weight w for up, is measured, with the agent receiving r1 in branches of spin up and r0 in those with spin down. Given w ′ > w, let B ′ be a composed bet in which, after Bw, the agent measures, in branches where he got r0, another spin with weight w ′ −w w for up, and in the new up branches his r0 reward is improved to r1. Assuming he does not think this new measurement has somehow altered the ratio of the original r1 branches with respect to the rest (whatever that might mean), and does not mind having to perform this second experiment, he should prefer B ′ over Bw. The total weight of branches with r1 is now w ′ (if there is no interference between the new and the old ones), but the final state is not the same as if B w ′ had been performed, as the amount of branches (if it has any meaning) and their histories are different. If such differences are irrelevant to the agent, or can somehow be erased (with he not minding such erasure), he should be indifferent between B ′ and B w ′ . Wallace argues that the total weight of each reward being the same in B ′ and B w ′ is enough to guarantee this can be done (this condition is necessary as this erasure is performed via unitary acts). Hence the agent prefers B w ′ over Bw, i.e. preference for the Bw's increases with w. If it does so in a continuous way, there should be some w such that the agent is indifferent between Bw and receiving the reward r with certainty, so we take this w to be the utility u(r).
Consider now an arbitrary bet A, giving r0, r or r1 according to the result of a quantum measurement of weights w0, wr and w1 (resp.). By the same argument as before, the agent should be indifferent between A and a bet A ′ similar to it, except that in those branches where he would receive r he instead performs another bet B u(r) . So A ′ gives only r0 and r1, with the weight of r1 being wru(r) + w1 (again, assuming no interferences). As before, an appropriate erasure might allow us to conclude A ′ is equivalent to B wr u(r)+w 1 . Hence wru(r) + w1 serves as a measure of the agent's interest in A. Comparing with the classical case, Wallace calls this quantity a expected utility, and concludes that, for all decision purposes, weights play the same role as probabilities. Note that for this example to work many assumptions had to be made, and the purpose of Wallace's axioms is to ensure their validity.
Comparing these three examples, we observe that the quantum case is an adaptation of just the first one. In Decision under Risk, the PMEU is a consequence of the way classical probabilities combine in successive bets, and the fact that the agent's subjective utility is determined in terms of a probability in some standard bet. In Wallace's case, it follows from the way Born weights behave under successive branchings (when there is no interference), plus assumptions about the agent's preferences allowing us to conclude that his subjective utilities could be inferred in terms of Born weights in some standard bets.
In Decision under Uncertainty, we first determine the agent's subjective probabilities about an event by comparison with some standard bets, based on events for which the agent's subjective probabilities are known. In practice, this is done using very simple bets, with dice or roulettes, whose likelihoods most agents should agree upon. Theoretically, some work is needed to ensure that, even if an agent does not believe in the fairness of such instruments, such standard bets can always be produced. Note that the particular ingredients of this case are not present in Wallace's. So the idea that Savage's theory of subjective probabilities has been adapted to show that the Born weights work as such is incorrect. This should have been clear from the start, as if all rational agents use the same Born weights as probabilities, these can hardly be considered subjective (unless this term is taken in its broadest sense, to include all we believe to know).
Conclusion
Most physicists' reaction to the idea of using Decision Theory to obtain the Born Rule is disbelief. But, upon learning that this theory provides a formal framework for subjective probabilities, and studying Deutsch's proposal, many find it appealing, an ingenious idea that might work if all thorny details could be ironed out. Unfortunately, as our analysis shows, the more one delves into the formal details, the less likely it seems that all pieces of the puzzle can fit together. Also, as we point out, neither Deutsch's nor Wallace's works really involve subjective probabilities.
Although some technical details had to be fixed, we found that Wallace's proof is essentially correct. However, there are problems in the justification of most axioms, stemming from ambiguities in the concepts used. This creates many loose ends, with the main problems being:
• Macrostate Discontinuities. Might invalidate the use of decoherence, and the axioms of SolCont e PrCont.
• Orthogonality. Without the meaning bestowed upon it by the Measurement Postulate, its usual role in quantum logic and decoherence is compromised.
• Decoherence. It is a way to form macrostates, fuzzy enough not to allow an objective branch counting. But its use, even if it can be justified despite the previous problems, would require rethinking Wallace's formalism in terms of density matrices, whose evolution for open quantum systems is not described by unitary operators. Without unitarity, Compat becomes unnecessary, and Eras would work without |ψ1| = |ψ2|, becoming so strong as to render the Born weights irrelevant.
• Macrostates. If decoherence can not be used, they have to be characterized in terms of some ill defined idea of macroscopic similarity.
In either case, they will probably not be mutually orthogonal, unless we impose the idealized condition OrthMacr. With it, branch counting becomes well defined, compromising BrIndif. Without it, several difficulties appear:
-branch decompositions might be non-unique, and not even similar; -distinct decompositions might lead to contradictory results in BrCons; -there might be macrostates not contained in any reward subspace; -it is not clear why reward subspaces should be mutually orthogonal; -OU might not include all possible branches of U ψ, compromising the formalization of Irrev, ReAv, Eras and MacIndif.
• Rewards. Characterizing reward subspaces solely in terms of payoffs (RePay) may be necessary to justify ReAv and the preservation of such subspaces by branching acts (BrAv) and erasures (Eras).
But to explain why preferences should not be affected by these acts (BrIndif and ErIndif) we have to assume a distinct (and possibly incompatible) characterization, that reward subspaces already encode everything that might affect such preferences (RePref).
• Rationality. Part of the justification for BrIndif, DiacCons and SolCont is circular, as it assumes rational decision is possible in an Everettian Universe, which in turn is guaranteed by presenting the Born Strategy as one such possibility. But this is only rational in the sense that it satisfies axioms that should be first justified.
Besides these, there are other problems with Irrev, Eras, Compat, BrIndif, StaSup, and DiacCons 17 . So we found that, instead of corroborating Wallace's informal presentation, the formalization of his ideas actually reveals more problems. Any attempts at correcting his work should start by clarifying the aforementioned ambiguities.
Even if Wallace's result turns out to be correct, it does not mean Born weights are an Everettian agent's subjective probabilities. They are parameters he would use to guide his decisions, formally in the same way a classical agent would use probabilities (objective or subjective). But as the agent is supposed to know all branches exist, the meaning he attributes to such weights can hardly be probabilistic (unless one appeals to self-locating uncertainty, which, as discussed in section 2.4, does not seem valid). Any attempt to interpret the reasons of an agent, in a possibly distinct Universe, in terms of our familiar concepts (subjective probabilities or degrees of belief) would certainly be a huge extrapolation.
A Classical decision theory
Decision Theory [Kre88, PI09] is an interdisciplinary area of study, concerned with developing principles to optimize decision making, and describing how people make real life decisions.
Decision problems can be framed in terms of an agent having to establish a preference order between lotteries. A lottery A = {(pi, ri)}i∈O consists of a set O of mutually exclusive possible outcomes, occurring with probability pi and leading to a reward ri. Each ri is identified with a simple lottery, that gives it with certainty as its unique reward. Given lotteries A and B, and t ∈ [0, 1], a compound lottery tA + (1 − t)B is defined as a lottery in which the probability of each reward r is tpA + (1 − t)pB, with pA, pB being the probabilities of r in A and B (equivalently, it means choosing randomly to bet on A or B, with probabilities t and 1 − t respectively).
A.1 Decision under certainty
In problems of Decision under Certainty, each lottery has only one outcome. The agent's preference is considered rational (in a strictly decision theoretic sense) if it is a total order, i.e. it satisfies the following conditions, for any lotteries A, B, C:
Transitivity. If A B and B C then A C.
A.2 Decision under risk
In Decision under Risk, lotteries can have multiple outcomes, with known probabilities. One of the first strategies developed was to consider the Expected Value of each lottery, i.e. the average value of the rewards, weighted according to their probabilities. This seems reasonable, by the Law of Large Numbers, but can lead to unreasonable results, like the St. Petersburg Paradox, when the number of runs is limited. In 1738, D. Bernoulli [Ber54] proposed a more flexible strategy, replacing the monetary values of the rewards by an utility function, leading to the Principle of Maximization of Expected Utility (PMEU). Given an utility function u(r) on the rewards r, it induces a preference order on lotteries A, B by
where EU is the expected utility, given for a lottery A = {(pi, ri)}i∈O by
We say that u(r) represents ≻ if it generates this order, via PMEU. Any ≻ generated this way satisfies Completeness, Transitivity, and, for any lotteries A, B, C:
Independence means the preference between compound lotteries should be based only on components that are different. The Archimedean Property formalizes the idea that sufficiently small changes in a lottery should not alter significantly the order, and also that no lottery can be so incommensurately better (resp. worse) than other, that it becomes impossible to reverse preferences by compounding it with a worse (resp. better) one. From these properties, others can be proved:
Monotonicity. If A ≻ B then tA + (1 − t)B is more preferable for higher values of t;
Continuity. If A ≻ B ≻ C there is a unique t ∈ (0, 1) such that B ∼ tA + (1 − t)C.
A function u will represent ≻ if and only if it satisfies the following Axioms of Utility, for any rewards r1, r2 and r3: Axiom U1. If r1 ≻ r2 then u(r1) > u(r2), and if r1 ∼ r2 then u(r1) = u(r2).
Axiom U2. If r3 ∼ tr1 + (1 − t)r2 then u(r3) = t · u(r1) + (1 − t) · u(r2).
The importance of the PMEU became clear in 1944, when Von Neumann and Morgenstern [VNM44] proved the following result, whose proof we sketch for comparison with Wallace's.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Representation Theorem (VNM).
If ≻ satisfies Completeness, Transitivity, Independence and the Archimedean Property, it can be represented by an utility function 18 .
Proof. Completeness and Transitivity imply that the lotteries are ordered in a single chain without loops, and, by the Archimedean Property, no lottery is infinitely better or worse than other. This allows the order to be described through a correspondence between the lotteries and real numbers. The idea is to construct this correspondence in such a way that the distribution of all lotteries on the real line is uniquely determined, via Expected Utility, by the position of 2 rewards. Let r0 and r1 be the least and most preferred rewards 19 . If r0 ∼ r1 we have a trivial situation, which can be represented by a constant utility function. If r0 ≺ r1, attribute to them utilities 20 u(r0) = 0 and u(r1) = 1. By Continuity, for any other reward r there is a unique t ∈ [0, 1] such that r ∼ tr1 + (1 − t)r0, and we set u(r) = t. By Monotonicity, this utility function places the rewards on the real line in increasing order of preference.
Placing all lotteries on the real line according to their Expected Utilities, we prove their distribution is compatible with ≻. As each reward of a lottery A is equivalent to some compound lottery of r0 and r1, by Substitutability A is also equivalent to a compound of r0 and r1, having the same Expected Utility. By Monotonicity, the preference on the lotteries tr1 + (1 − t)r0 increases with t, and as the same happens with their Expected Utilities, they are compatible.
The conditions of the theorem are the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Axioms, considered requirements for rationality in the context of Decision under Risk.
A.3 Decision under uncertainty
In Decision under Uncertainty, there are multiple possible outcomes, but their probabilities are unknown. Instead of lotteries, it is usual to frame problems in terms of a choice between acts which, depending on some possible states of the world (present or future), will lead to payoffs (consequences).
Many decision strategies (maximax, maximin, minimax regret, etc.) have been proposed, usually focusing on best or worst case scenarios. These are useful in some situations, but can lead to absurd results in others, as they disregard important data, such as non-extremal payoffs, or the low likelihoods of some states of the world.
Another possibility is to use subjective probabilities, estimates by the agent of the likelihoods of the states of the world. However, in many cases the decision can be very sensitive to the estimates used, especially when there are unlikely states giving great payoffs. In 1954, L. Savage [Sav72] proved that any preference order satisfying some axioms can be represented, via PMEU, by some utility function and subjective probabilities.
Let S be the set of possible states of the world. Not all details of a state are relevant to the problem, so Savage considers events, subsets of S sharing some common characteristics. For example, the event E ="it rains tomorrow" consists of all states in which this happens. The advantage of working with sets of states is that they can be broken into smaller events, e.g. E can have as subevents "it rains tomorrow and the stock goes up" and "it rains tomorrow and the result of a die is 3".
An act is defined as a function f : S → P, where P is the set of payoffs, so that f (s) = x means x is the payoff resulting from the act f if the state of world happens to be s. Each payoff x is identified with the constant act which results x for all states. Given acts f and g, and an event E, we define a new act [E, f ; g] by [E, f ; g](s) = f (s) if s ∈ E, g(s) if s / ∈ E.
Savage assumes, for a preference order ≻ on acts, the following axioms, for any acts f , g, h, k, payoffs x, y, z, w, and events E, F .
Axiom S1 (Nondegeneracy). There are payoffs x, y such that x ≻ y. This is just a condition to have a nontrivial decision problem.
Axiom S2. ≻ is complete and transitive.
This axiom is similar to Independence: the preference between acts depends only on the events where they differ. It allows us to define, for each event E, a conditional preference order ≻ meaning "f is preferable to g given E", i.e. if the agent assumes E will happen he will prefer f to g.
We say E is null if f ∼ E g for all f , g. Intuitively, it means the agent does not believe E can happen, so he does not care about the payoffs of f and g in case of E.
Axiom S4. If E is not null, then x ≻ E y ⇔ x ≻ y.
Hence the agent's preference on payoffs does not depend on which event leads to them. The intuitive justification for this axiom is as follows. [E, x; y] gives a better payoff in case of event E than otherwise. [F, x; y] gives the same payoffs, but the event that triggers the good payoff is F instead of E. As by S4 the agent only cares about the payoff and not how he got it, the only explanation for preferring [E, x; y] to [F, x; y] is that he thinks E is more likely to happen than F . So the same preference should hold for any other pair of good/bad payoffs z, w.
This induces an order on events by E ≻ F if and only if [E, x; y] ≻ [F, x; y] whenever x ≻ y.
The idea is that, if the agent prefers to receive a better reward in case E happens, than in case F happens, it means he believes E to be more likely than F . Savage proves that, if the agent's preferences satisfy the previous axioms, this order will have the required properties to be a qualitative probability on events. The next axiom allows him to turn it into a quantitative one.
Axiom S6. If f ≻ g then for any payoff x there is a finite partition
Ei such that [Ei, x; f ] ≻ g and f ≻ [Ei, x; g] for every i. This axiom is similar to the Archimedean Property. It means that the set of states of the world can always be decomposed in sufficiently unlikely events Ei, so that changing the payoff on one of them is not enough to alter the preference between f and g. It also means that no payoff is infinitely good or bad, as in such case it would alter preferences for any nonnull Ei. In practice, this decomposition can be achieved, for example, by including in the description of the events the results of a large number of dice, as each die divides an event in 6 smaller ones.
Savage extends this to events, proving that if F ≻ E there is a finite partition S = · ∪ n i=1 Ei such that F ≻ E ∪ Ei for any i. Some Ei's may be more likely than others, but, after some technical work, Savage obtains partitions having equally likely events. Then it is straightforward to obtain probabilities. Given a partition of S into n equally likely events, we attribute to each of these events a subjective probability 1 n . If the minimum number of these pieces needed to cover some event E is m, its subjective probability should be in the interval [ ]. The exact value is then defined by a limiting process.
Having the agent's subjective probabilities, Savage then follows the lines of Von Neumann-Morgenstern to obtain an utility function which, through the PMEU, represents the preference order.
He includes one last axiom, needed for situations with infinitely many payoffs. It requires that if f is preferred, given E, to all payoffs g can give in such event, then f is preferred to g given E.
Axiom S7. If f ≻ E g(s) for any s ∈ E, then f ≻ Savage's axioms are less clear than the previous ones, but upon close inspection they seem reasonable, and are usually accepted as rationality conditions for Decision under Uncertainty.
